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Gateway Hotel affirmed the Seventh Circuit’s holding in River Road and
interpreted the Bankruptcy Code in a way that improperly shifts this
balance towards the most senior creditors at the expense of business. This
Note will analyze the circuit disagreement over the cramdown provision in
the Bankruptcy Code and the Supreme Court’s ultimate resolution. It will
argue that in light of recent trends in the credit marketsincluding highly
liquid secondary markets for debt and aggressive lenders looking to
speculate on restructuring businessesthe Supreme Court’s current
interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code supports improper policy. It will also
argue that consistent interpretation between two provisions in the
Bankruptcy Code§§ 363 and 1129(b), focusing on balancing the needs of
debtors to restructure with the rights of creditors to be repaidsuggests
that the Supreme Court should have interpreted the cramdown provision to
grant more flexibility in plan design. This Note argues that Congress, in
light of the RadLAX decision, should amend the Bankruptcy Code to better
suit the goals of the modern-day bankruptcy.
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INTRODUCTION
In the fast-paced and high-volume world of bankruptcy, a small
disagreement in statutory interpretation sealed the fate of billions of dollars
of investment capital.1 In April 2012, the Supreme Court resolved the split
between the Third, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits over “[w]hether a debtor
may pursue a chapter 11 plan that proposes to sell assets free of liens
without allowing the secured creditor to credit bid, but instead providing it
with the indubitable equivalent of its claim under Section
1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) of the Bankruptcy Code.”2 The Fifth Circuit in Bank of
New York Trust Co. v. Official Unsecured Creditors’ Committee (In re The
Pacific Lumber Co.) and the Third Circuit in In re Philadelphia
1

Vincent S.J. Buccola & Ashley C. Keller, Credit Bidding and the Design of Bankruptcy Auctions,
18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 99, 100 (2010) (noting that whether secured creditors are entitled to credit bid
“likely holds tens of billions of dollars in the balance”).
2
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 132 S.
Ct. 2065 (2012) (No. 11-166).
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Newspapers, LLC held that a debtor can confirm an asset sale plan that
restricts credit bidding under the indubitable equivalent standard of
subsection (iii),3 while the Seventh Circuit in River Road Hotel Partners v.
Amalgamated Bank held that a debtor cannot confirm a plan in this
manner; rather, any plan that proposes to sell assets free and clear of liens
must presumptively permit credit bidding.4 The Supreme Court affirmed
the Seventh Circuit’s holding in River Road, renamed RadLAX Gateway
Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank,5 in a brief opinion that unnecessarily
restricts the cramdown options available to bankruptcy courts and fosters
the continued use of aggressive lender strategies.
In re Philadelphia Newspapers and River Road are, above all, cases of
statutory interpretation.6 They analyzed § 1129(b)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy
Code, which permits a debtor to confirm a plan over the opposition of
secured creditors if: (i) the secured creditors retain their liens on the
collateral and receive deferred cash payments equal to the present value of
their secured claim; (ii) subject to the secured creditors’ right to credit bid,
the debtors sell the collateral “free and clear of such liens” and such liens
“attach to the proceeds of [the] sale”; or (iii) the plan provides the secured
creditors with the indubitable equivalent of their claims.7 The Third Circuit
in In re Philadelphia Newspapers concluded that the three subprovisions of
§ 1129(b) are disjunctive, and that a plan may be confirmed under any
subprovision,8 while the Seventh Circuit in River Road concluded that what
the plan proposes to accomplish governs the subprovision under which it
must be confirmed.9
Focusing on the impact of the statutory interpretation will add clarity
and context to the debate. The Third and Fifth Circuits held that the
proponent of a plan, typically the debtor, may choose whether to restrict
credit bidding at an auction sale.10 The Seventh Circuit, on the other hand,
enforced a functional classification for the plan: what the plan proposes to

3

In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 301 (3d Cir. 2010); Bank of N.Y. Trust Co. v.
Official Unsecured Creditors’ Comm. (In re The Pac. Lumber Co.), 584 F.3d 229, 246 (5th Cir. 2009).
Credit bidding is the practice of a creditor bidding at a bankruptcy auction sale of assets in credit up to
the value of its claim.
4
651 F.3d 642, 652–53 (7th Cir. 2011), aff’d sub nom. RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v.
Amalgamated Bank, 132 S. Ct. 2065 (2012).
5
For the duration of this Note, I will refer to the Seventh Circuit opinion as “River Road” and to
the Supreme Court opinion as “RadLAX Gateway Hotel” or “RadLAX.”
6
See River Rd., 651 F.3d at 647; In re Phila. Newspapers, 599 F.3d at 304.
7
11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A) (2006).
8
599 F.3d at 305–06, 310.
9
651 F.3d at 652.
10
In re Phila. Newspapers, 599 F.3d at 301; Bank of N.Y. Trust Co. v. Official Unsecured
Creditors’ Comm. (In re The Pac. Lumber Co.), 584 F.3d 229, 247 (5th Cir. 2009).
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do governs how the plan will be classified.11 According to the Seventh
Circuit, a debtor does not have the choice to prohibit credit bidding for an
asset sale plan. Thus, the statutory interpretation of § 1129(b) can be boiled
down to proponent choice, on the one hand, and functional classification on
the other.
This Note will discuss the Supreme Court’s resolution of the circuit
split formed by the three key cases. It will first explain how a plan can be
crammed down within bankruptcy, highlighting additional procedural
requirements incident to confirming a plan under the various subprovisions
of § 1129(b). It will continue with a discussion of the three cases that
formed this circuit splitRiver Road, In re Philadelphia Newspapers, and
In re The Pacific Lumber Co.highlighting the differences in their
reasoning. It will then discuss the Supreme Court’s brief opinion resolving
the circuit split.
The Note will continue with an analysis of the recent trends in
bankruptcy in which credit bidding is used as a tool to undermine the
reorganizational goal of a Chapter 11 proceeding. Granting courts and
debtors the choice to restrict credit bidding may offer a remedy to
aggressive credit bidding tactics, benefitting debtors and increasing the
likelihood of a productive rehabilitation of their businesses. Next, I will
discuss the two-step analysis courts must apply in order to confirm a plan
under the indubitable equivalent standard of § 1129(b) and show that the
Supreme Court’s failure to conduct this analysis led it to erroneously
interpret the statute. First, I will argue that a plan that proposes to sell
assets of the debtor free and clear of liens may be confirmed under the
indubitable equivalent prong. Second, I maintain that an asset sale plan that
restricts credit bidding will provide creditors with the indubitable
equivalent of their claim if the creditors are paid, in full, the judicially
determined value of their claim. In light of this, I argue that Congress
should respond to the Supreme Court’s opinion by revising the credit
bidding provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.
I. THE CRAMDOWN REQUIREMENTS OF § 1129(B)
Central to the controversy at hand is the meaning of 11 U.S.C.
§ 1129(b): the cramdown provision of the Bankruptcy Code. This section
will briefly discuss the cramdown provision, including its purpose and
requirements. Because a full understanding of the cramdown provision
requires additional knowledge of a bankruptcy proceeding, the following
three subsections will discuss the concepts of indubitable equivalence,
valuation, and credit bidding.

11
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Debtors choose to file a Chapter 11 reorganization instead of a Chapter
7 liquidation because they wish to continue operating as a reorganized
business after the bankruptcy process.12 In order to allow this outcome,
Chapter 11 requires debtors to propose and confirm a plan of
reorganization. This plan allows a debtor to restructure its assets, discharge
its debts, and continue its operations.13
Section 1129 of the Bankruptcy Code provides the minimum
requirements for confirming a plan.14 In the majority of cases, a plan will
have the support of all classes of creditors and be confirmed by consent.15
In order for any plan to be confirmed via consent, the Code requires all
impaired16 classes of creditors to approve the plan.17 However, if a plan
does not have the support of all classes of creditors, § 1129(b) provides the
means for a plan to be confirmed despite the objection by a class of
creditors (known as a “cramdown”).18 If a proposed plan lacks unanimous
support of all classes of impaired creditors, it may still be confirmed
against dissenting creditors if “the plan does not discriminate unfairly, and
is fair and equitable, with respect to each class of claims or interests
that . . . has not accepted[] the plan.”19
The Code does not add clarity to what is meant by “does not
discriminate unfairly.” However, after analyzing the legislative history,
Kenneth Klee notes: “In a nutshell, if the plan protects the legal rights of a
dissenting class in a manner consistent with the treatment of other
classes . . . then the plan does not discriminate unfairly with respect to the
dissenting class.”20 The Code provides for a plan to be “fair and equitable
with respect to a class” of creditors if it includes one of three

12

See 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1.07[1][a], at 1-25 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer
eds., 16th ed. 2012); 7 id. ¶ 1129.01, at 1129-11.
13
7 COLLIER, supra note 12, ¶ 1129.01, at 1129-11 to -13.
14
See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(1)–(6) (2006); In re The Pac. Lumber Co., 584 F.3d at 245. See also
Kenneth N. Klee, All You Ever Wanted to Know About Cram Down Under the New Bankruptcy Code,
53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 133, 136–37 (1979) for a summary of these provisions.
15
Wayne Johnson, In re Bonner Mall Partnership: The Ninth Circuit Embraces the New Value
“Exception,” 21 CAL. BANKR. J. 259, 259 n.8 (1993); Klee, supra note 14, at 133.
16
11 U.S.C. § 1124 defines when a class of claims or interests is unimpaired and, thus, does not
have to vote to accept a plan under § 1129. Section 1124(1) dictates that a creditor is unimpaired when
the plan “leaves unaltered the legal, equitable, and contractual rights” of the creditor. Under § 1124(2),
a plan may also leave creditors unimpaired if it cures defaults, reinstates the maturity of the claim,
compensates the holder for any damages, and does not otherwise alter any creditors’ rights. See
7 COLLIER, supra note 12, ¶ 1124.01, at 1124-3. An impaired creditor is one that does not fit the
characteristics of § 1124.
17
§ 1129(a)(8).
18
Id. § 1129(b).
19
Id. § 1129(b)(1).
20
Klee, supra note 14, at 142.
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requirements.21 First, the plan may provide for a creditor to retain liens and
receive deferred cash payments totaling the present value of the claim as of
the date of the plan.22 Second, the plan may instead provide for a sale of the
debtor’s assets free and clear of liens, subject to § 363(k) of the Code
granting the debtors the presumptive right to credit bid, with the liens
attaching to the proceeds of the sale.23
The third option dictates that the plan may provide for the creditors to
receive the “indubitable equivalent” of their claim.24 The phrase
“indubitable equivalence” was first coined by Judge Learned Hand in
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Murel Holding Corp. (In re Murel
Holding Corp.) as a means of cramming down a plan of reorganization
under the prior Bankruptcy Code.25 This provision allows a bankruptcy
court to support alternative means of plan reorganization proposed by the
debtor, so long as the creditor receives the benefit of its bargain: the
undeniable equivalent of the value of its claim.26 The legislative history
surrounding this subprovision is brief, but provides two examples of what
could qualify as indubitable equivalence: abandoning the collateral to the
class of creditors, or granting the creditors a replacement lien on similar
collateral.27 In both instances, the creditor is realizing the value of its
secured claim.
Central to the circuit split is the nature of these three cramdown
subprovisions. The Fifth and Third Circuits held that the three alternatives
Congress provided in § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)–(iii) are nonexclusive
requirements.28 A debtor may satisfy any one of them, or be granted any
other reasonable means of “fair and equitable” treatment.29 However, the
Seventh Circuit held that a plan may only be crammed down under the
indubitable equivalent standard of subsection (iii) if the plan does not
provide for treatment similar to that found in options (i) or (ii).30 The
Supreme Court upheld the Seventh Circuit’s logic, affirming that how a
plan is structured will dictate under which provision it must be confirmed.31
21

§ 1129(b)(2).
Id. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i).
23
Id. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii).
24
Id. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii).
25
In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 310 (3d Cir. 2010); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Murel
Holding Corp. (In re Murel Holding Corp.), 75 F.2d 941, 942 (2d Cir. 1935).
26
In re Murel Holding Corp., 75 F.2d at 942.
27
124 CONG. REC. 32,407 (1978).
28
In re Phila. Newspapers, 599 F.3d at 305–06; Bank of N.Y. Trust Co. v. Official Unsecured
Creditors’ Comm. (In re The Pac. Lumber Co.), 584 F.3d 229, 245 (5th Cir. 2009).
29
In re Phila. Newspapers, 599 F.3d at 309–10; In re The Pac. Lumber Co., 584 F.3d at 245.
30
River Rd. Hotel Partners v. Amalgamated Bank, 651 F.3d 642, 652 (7th Cir. 2011), aff’d sub
nom. RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 132 S. Ct. 2065 (2012).
31
RadLAX, 132 S. Ct. at 2072–73.
22
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A. The Indubitable Equivalent Standard
An understanding of the cramdown provision of the Bankruptcy Code
would be incomplete without a discussion of what the Code means by
indubitable equivalence. In order for a plan to be confirmed under
subsection (iii) of § 1129(b), the plan must provide for the creditor to
realize the “indubitable equivalent” of its claim.32 The Bankruptcy Code
does not define indubitable equivalence, but uses the term in both
§ 1129(b)—allowing confirmation of a plan over the objection of a class of
creditors33—and in § 361—providing adequate protection to secured
creditors during a Chapter 11 case.34 The legislative history for § 1129
dictates that “[t]he indubitable equivalent language is intended to follow
the strict approach taken by Judge Learned Hand in In Re Murel Holding
Corp.”35
In In re Murel Holding Corp., the debtors, who owned a residential
apartment building in which Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. held a
security interest, proposed a plan of reorganization pursuant to § 77(B) of
the former Bankruptcy Code.36 According to this plan, the debtors would
remodel the apartment complex and repay Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.
over a ten-year period with the proceeds.37 Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.
refused to consent to this plan and requested that the district court vacate
the stay of its foreclosure proceedings against the debtors; however, the
district court denied the motion.38
On appeal to the Second Circuit, Judge Hand held that the district
court was not entitled to grant a stay against foreclosure.39 Judge Hand
reasoned that unwilling creditors could only be forced to accept a plan of
reorganization if the plan “provide[d] adequate protection for the
realization . . . of the full value of their interest, claims, or liens.”40 Judge
Hand then elaborated on what constitutes “adequate protection”:
It is plain that “adequate protection” must be completely compensatory; and
that payment ten years hence is not generally the equivalent of payment now.
Interest is indeed the common measure of the difference, but a creditor who
fears the safety of his principal will scarcely be content with that; he wishes to
32

11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) (2006).
Id. § 1129(b).
34
Id. § 361 (providing a list of potential ways to provide adequate protection when required under
§§ 362, 363, or 364).
35
S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 127 (1978).
36
Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Murel Holding Corp. (In re Murel Holding Corp.), 75 F.2d 941, 941–42
(2d Cir. 1935).
37
Id. at 942.
38
Id. at 941–42.
39
Id. at 943.
40
Id. at 942.
33
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get his money or at least the property. We see no reason to suppose that the
statute was intended to deprive him of that in the interest of junior holders,
unless by a substitute of the most indubitable equivalence.41

Importantly, Judge Hand outlined four ways in which a creditor could
receive adequate protection: (1) the liens could be maintained; (2) the
property could be sold free of the liens with the liens attaching to the
proceeds; (3) “[t]he value of the liens” could be appraised and paid by the
creditor; or (4) the judge may “equitably and fairly . . . provide such
protection, that is, adequate protection, when the other methods are not
chosen.”42 These four options for providing adequate protection in the
cramdown context still appear in Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. If a
creditor’s liens are maintained, the creditor is classified as “unimpaired”
and by definition will receive the full value of its bargain. Unimpaired
creditors do not need to consent to any plan confirmation.43 The remaining
three options appear as the cramdown provisions in § 1129(b)(2)(A).
Selling the property free and clear of liens is codified in
§ 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii), appraising the value of the liens and having them paid
by the creditor is codified in § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i), and Judge Hand’s
indubitable equivalent standard appears in § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii).44 Since
Judge Hand’s opinion heavily influenced the cramdown provisions in the
Bankruptcy Code,45 the provisions themselves should be understood with In
re Murel Holding Corp.’s reasoning in mind.
The indubitable equivalent standard Judge Hand established in In re
Murel Holding Corp. also appears in § 361 of the Bankruptcy Code.
Section 361 provides the means a court may use to grant adequate
protection to a creditor during the bankruptcy process.46 During a Chapter
11 proceeding, creditors are prohibited from foreclosing on their collateral
without judicial permission, and debtors are permitted to cease all
maintenance payments to creditors under a provision called the “automatic
stay.”47 Because of this, a creditor may fear its collateral will decline in
value over time and petition for relief from the automatic stay in order to
remove its collateral.48 The court must grant the petition if the debtor does

41

Id.
Id. (citing and quoting 11 U.S.C. § 207(b)(5) (1935) (current version at 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)
(2006))) (internal quotation marks omitted).
43
§ 1124. See also supra note 16 (discussing unimpaired creditors).
44
§ 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)–(iii).
45
See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
46
§ 361.
47
Id. § 362(a); see also 1 COLLIER, supra note 12, ¶ 1.05[1], at 1-19 to -20.
48
3 COLLIER, supra note 12, ¶ 362.07, at 362-104 to -105. See also id. ¶ 362.08 for a discussion of
the procedures for seeking relief from a stay.
42
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not provide adequate protection49 to ensure that the creditor’s property
rights in its collateral are not compromised.50
Cases addressing whether a creditor is realizing the indubitable
equivalent of its claim focus their analysis on Judge Hand’s two-prong
approach of value and risk: the plan must adequately compensate the
creditor for the current value of its claimincluding principal and
interestand for the risk that the principal will not be repaid.51 Despite this
test’s stringency, the indubitable equivalent standard gives bankruptcy
judges sufficient flexibility to craft reorganization plans to fit the facts and
circumstances of a given case.52
B. Valuation of a Creditor’s Claim
Valuation of a creditor’s claim by a bankruptcy court is another
essential factor in § 1129 cramdown proceedings. In order for a plan to be
confirmed under § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II)—providing for deferred cash
payments totaling the present value of the claim—a claim must first be
valued.53 In addition, valuing a claim is necessary to ensure that a creditor
receives the indubitable equivalent of its claim under subsection (iii).
Section 1129 requires a secured creditor to be compensated in the
“allowed amount” of its claim.54 Chapter 11 calls for either the bankruptcy
trustee55 or the debtor56 to file schedules of claims at the commencement of
the case. Any filed claim is presumptively allowed unless an interested
party objects.57 If an objection arises, the claim is evaluated both for
49

One form of adequate protection granted by courts is periodic cash payments from the debtor to
the creditor in order to compensate the creditor for the decline in collateral value during the automatic
stay. Id. ¶ 362.07[3][b][i]. Other means include requiring the debtor to insure the property and requiring
the debtor to pay any taxes on the property. Id. ¶ 362.07[3][f], at 362-117.
50
Id. ¶ 362.07[3], at 362-106.
51
See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Murel Holding Corp. (In re Murel Holding Corp.), 75 F.2d 941, 942–
43 (2d Cir. 1935); see also Brite v. Sun Country Dev., Inc. (In re Sun Country Dev., Inc.), 764 F.2d
406, 409 (5th Cir. 1985) (discussing the value and risk of replacement liens).
52
See, e.g., In re Sun Country Dev., Inc., 764 F.2d at 409 (finding the indubitable equivalent
standard met when the debtor substituted one lien on 200 acres of land for twenty-one separate liens on
twenty-one individual lots); Woods v. Pine Mountain, Ltd. (In re Pine Mountain, Ltd.), 80 B.R. 171,
174–75 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1987) (holding that the indubitable equivalent standard could be satisfied with
a subordinated note that provided enough equity cushion on the prime note); In re May, 174 B.R. 832,
840 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1994) (agreeing to confirm a plan if the debtors amended it to surrender a portion
of the creditor’s collateral).
53
11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II) (2006).
54
Id.
55
Id. § 1106(a)(2) (explaining that the duties of a trustee include filing of the schedule of claims “if
the debtor has not done so”).
56
Id. § 521(a)(1).
57
Id. § 502(a). Any creditor, indenture trustee, or equity security holder may file a proof of claim
or interest in the estate. Id. § 501(a).
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allowance and for valuation as of the date of the petition.58 This process
determines the allowed amount of claim compensation for purposes of
§ 1129.59
The value of a claim may be determined judicially or by sale at
auction.60 In order to establish the dollar value of a claim, the court must
determine the current market value of the collateral (if any) securing the
loan. A judicial determination of collateral takes place at a hearing,
pursuant to § 506(a)(1).61 Judicially determining the value of a claim can be
a very complex process. Section 506(a)(1) directs valuation to be made “in
light of the purpose of the valuation and of the proposed disposition or use
of such property”;62 however, it does not provide additional guidance.
When addressing this flexibility, the Supreme Court in Associates
Commercial Corp. v. Rash was careful not to prescribe an overly particular
valuation standard for the bankruptcy courts, noting that facts and
circumstances should govern each individual decision: “Our recognition
that the replacement-value standard, not the foreclosure-value standard,
governs in cram down cases leaves to bankruptcy courts, as triers of fact,
identification of the best way of ascertaining replacement value on the basis
of the evidence presented.”63
A bankruptcy court can also value a claim through an auction sale of
the collateral. A debtor may sell its assets with judicial approval outside of
the ordinary course of business pursuant to § 363(b), or may sell its assets
as part of a plan of reorganization pursuant to § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii).64 If the
collateral is to be sold during a liquidation sale of the debtor’s assets or as a
part of a reorganization plan, the value of the collateral should be
substantially equivalent to the consideration received by the estate at the

58

See id. § 502(b) (providing that “the court, after notice and a hearing, shall determine the amount
of such claim in lawful currency of the United States as of the date of the filing of the petition”).
59
Id. This section provides nine reasons why a claim may be disallowed, including claims that are
unenforceable, claims for insiders, and claims that were not timely filed. Id. All other properly filed
claims of creditors will be allowed. These include claims secured by a lien and properly recorded
pursuant to the UCC (for example, a mortgage or lien on inventory or other property); unsecured claims
that are protected by statute (for example, labor wage claims, claims for retirement benefits, or claims
for payment for services); or any other claims to ownership of the business (for example, bondholders
or shareholders).
60
River Rd. Hotel Partners v. Amalgamated Bank, 651 F.3d 642, 650 (7th Cir. 2011), aff’d sub
nom. RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 132 S. Ct. 2065 (2012).
61
§ 506(a)(1); see also 4 COLLIER, supra note 12, ¶ 506.03[4][a], at 506-22 to -23.
62
§ 506(a)(1).
63
520 U.S. 953, 965 n.6 (1997).
64
§ 363(b)(1) (“The trustee, after notice and a hearing, may use, sell, or lease, other than in the
ordinary course of business, property of the estate . . . .”); id. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) (“[The plan provides]
for the sale, subject to section 363(k) of this title, of any property that is subject to the liens securing
such claims, free and clear of such liens . . . .”).
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sale.65 Many bankruptcy courts have noted that as long as the sale
conditions are fair, and the transaction took place at arm’s length, the
consideration received through a sale is a better indicator of collateral value
than an appraiser’s estimate.66
Secured claims that are allowed by the bankruptcy court receive
special attention by the Code. Oversecured claims—claims in which the
face value of the claim is less than the current market value of the
collateral—are allowed to the full amount of the debt.67 On the other hand,
undersecured claimswhere the claim’s face value is greater than the
current market value of the collateralare bifurcated.68 These claims are
divided into a secured claim to the extent of the current market value of the
collateral securing the claim and an unsecured claim for the balance.69
A creditor may avoid the bifurcation process of § 506(a) by election
and treat the entire face value of its claim as secured under § 1111(b)(2).70
A creditor may not make a § 1111(b) election if its interest in the collateral
is of “inconsequential value,” or if the creditor “has recourse against the
debtor” and the collateral is to be sold pursuant to § 363 or under a plan of
reorganization.71 This election is attractive to creditors who are retaining
liens on the collateral through reorganization and believe both that their
collateral is undervalued and that the debtor is likely to reenter bankruptcy
before satisfying the creditor’s claim.72 The risk of a restructured entity
filing for bankruptcy again is substantial, occurring between 25% and 33%
65

4 COLLIER, supra note 12, ¶ 506.03[6][b], at 506-37.
Romley v. Sun Nat’l Bank (In re The Two “S” Corp.), 875 F.2d 240, 244 (9th Cir. 1989)
(“Evidence of other appraised values is also irrelevant, because the sale price is a better indicator of the
asset’s value than any estimate of value given prior to sale.”). See also Takisaki v. Alpine Grp., Inc. (In
re Alpine Grp., Inc.), 151 B.R. 931, 935 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1993) (“The offered price . . . is conclusive
evidence of the property’s value.”). Conversely, evidence of value obtained by an offer to purchase the
collateral may not be persuasive if the terms of the offer are not acceptable to the debtor and the offer is
rejected. See In re Smith, 42 B.R. 198, 200 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1984).
67
§ 506(a)(1) (“An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which the estate
has an interest . . . is a secured claim to the extent of the value of such creditor’s interest in the estate’s
interest in such property . . . .”). The Code defines the concept of “collateral” as the “creditor’s interest
in the estate’s interest in such property.” Id. The Supreme Court has confirmed that this phrase should
be interpreted as the common notion of “collateral.” United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood
Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 372 (1988).
68
4 COLLIER, supra note 12, ¶ 506.03[4], at 506-20.
69
§ 506(a)(1); see also 4 COLLIER, supra note 12, ¶ 506.03[4], at 506-20 & n.57.
70
See, e.g., In re River E. Plaza, LLC, 669 F.3d 826, 829, 831, 833 (7th Cir. 2012); 680 Fifth Ave.
Assocs. v. Mut. Benefit Life Ins. Co. in Rehab. (In re 680 Fifth Ave. Assocs.), 29 F.3d 95, 97 (2d Cir.
1994) (“Section 1111(b) allows an undersecured creditor either to elect to have its entire claim treated
as secured, or to have the claim bifurcated into secured and unsecured portions, notwithstanding the fact
that under 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(1), the nonrecourse nature of the loan would otherwise bar a deficiency
claim for the unsecured portion of the loan.”).
71
§ 1111(b)(1)(B).
72
In re River E. Plaza, 669 F.3d at 830.
66
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of the time.73 By making this election, a creditor foregoes the right to an
immediate payment of the secured claim in exchange for maintaining a lien
over the property, with the expectation that it will either be paid by the
debtor over time or yield greater proceeds from a later foreclosure sale of
the recovered collateral.74
C. Credit Bidding During a Sale of Assets Free and Clear of Liens
The final critical topic for understanding § 1129 cramdown
proceedings is the credit bidding process. In order for a plan to be
confirmed under § 1129(b)(ii), a sale of the debtor’s assets must be
conducted subject to § 363(k).75 Section 363(k) permits a creditor with an
allowed claim to bid for the debtor’s assets at auction and, “unless the court
for cause orders otherwise,” to offset the value of its lien “against the
purchase price of [the] property.”76 This practice is commonly referred to as
“credit bidding,” and was recognized under bankruptcy law prior to the
current Code.77 In practice, credit bidding authorizes a creditor with an
allowed claim78 to bid on credit at an auction sale up to the full face value
of its claim.79 This is true even if the creditor’s claim is

73

Id.; see also Stuart C. Gilson, Transactions Costs and Capital Structure Choice: Evidence from
Financially Distressed Firms, 52 J. FIN. 161, 162 (1997); Edith Shwalb Hotchkiss, Postbankruptcy
Performance and Management Turnover, 50 J. FIN. 3, 15 (1995); Lynn M. LoPucki & William C.
Whitford, Patterns in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 78 CORNELL
L. REV. 597, 608 (1993); Harvey R. Miller & Shai Y. Waisman, Does Chapter 11 Reorganization
Remain a Viable Option for Distressed Businesses for the Twenty-First Century?, 78 AM. BANKR. L.J.
153, 188 (2004).
74
In re River E. Plaza, 669 F.3d at 830. In order to better illustrate this provision, imagine a lender
holds a $100 million secured interest in a piece of property, the value of which has declined to $50
million. Traditional bifurcation would allow for a $50 million secured loan that would receive priority
repayment in the plan, and a $50 million unsecured claim that in most cases is unlikely to be repaid. If
the lender would prefer to terminate its relationship with the debtor, is not confident that the company
will survive reorganization, or is concerned that the collateral will continue to decrease in value, it
might prefer to take the current value in bifurcation. However, if the lender believes that the value of
the property will increase or that the debtor will be capable of making payments once reorganized, the
creditor may prefer to make a § 1111(b) election and retain a secured lien for the original $100 million
value. The creditor could then negotiate structured payments over a period of time (for example, five
years) in order to repay the $100 million loan.
75
§ 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii).
76
Id. § 363(k).
77
See, e.g., Morgan v. Blieden (In re Mun. Gas Co.), 107 F.2d 133, 134 (8th Cir. 1939); Miners
Sav. Bank of Pittston, Pa. v. Joyce, 97 F.2d 973, 975 (3d Cir. 1938).
78
See Nat’l Bank of Commerce of El Dorado v. McMullan (In re McMullan), 196 B.R. 818, 835
(Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1996) (holding that a creditor may not bid on a lien that has not yet been determined
to be valid).
79
3 COLLIER, supra note 12, ¶ 363.09, at 363-79. See also 4 id. ¶ 506.02, at 506-8 to -9
(summarizing provisions within the Bankruptcy Code that protect the holders of secured claims).
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undersecuredmeaning the present market value of the collateral securing
the claim is less than the face value of the claim.80
To illustrate this concept by example, suppose Debtor borrowed $100
million from Creditor secured by Debtor’s rental apartment complex. Later,
when the apartment complex is only worth $50 million, Debtor files for
bankruptcy. In the plan of reorganization, Debtor wishes to sell the
apartment complex at auction and use the proceeds to pay Creditor’s claim.
At the auction, Creditor may “bid” up to $100 millionthe face value of
Creditor’s claim. Because the apartment complex has a current market
value of $50 million, Creditor may easily become the highest bidder at
auction without using any additional cash.
A bankruptcy auction determines the market value of the
collateralthe value of the secured claimbut a creditor’s claim may be
bifurcated into a secured portion and an unsecured portion. If Creditor with
a $100 million face-value claim bids $50 million on the property (the
current market value) and wins, Creditor still retains an unsecured $50
million claim on the estate for the difference. If, however, it takes an $80
million credit bid to guarantee a win at auction, Creditor only retains a $20
million unsecured claim against the estate. This is of little import, however,
as unsecured claims are rarely paid, and when they are it is for mere
pennies on the dollar.81 To a creditor, the value of its claim is the value of
the secured portion of its claim.
The presumptive right to credit bid provides many advantages to
creditors. It is often seen as a check against low valuation of collateral at an
auction sale.82 Alternatively, some view credit bidding as granting secured
lenders the right to ensure collateral is not sold at a value below a price to
which they would consent.83 Most importantly, if a lender cannot obtain the
requisite cash to bid in an auction, credit bidding may be the only way a
lender is able to attend. One of the best ways to increase the amount
realized at auction is to increase the quantity of interested bidders.84 Credit
bidding may be a double-edged sword, however, as debtors frequently
80

See, e.g., Cohen v. KB Mezzanine Fund II, LP (In re SubMicron Sys. Corp.), 432 F.3d 448, 460–
61 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that a creditor’s bid sets the creditor’s allowed secured claim under
11 U.S.C. § 506(a)); In re Morgan House Gen. P’ship, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1306, at *3 (E.D. Pa.
Feb. 7, 1997); In re Realty Invs., Ltd., 72 B.R. 143, 146 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1987); S. REP. NO. 95-989, at
56 (1978) (“No prior valuation under section 506(a) would limit this bidding right, since the bid at the
sale would be determinative of value.”).
81
Douglas Baird et al., The Dynamics of Large and Small Chapter 11 Cases: An Empirical Study
19, 21–23 (Yale Int’l Ctr. for Fin., Working Paper No. 05-29, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=866865.
82
In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 334 (3d Cir. 2010) (Ambro, J., dissenting).
83
Id.
84
See Buccola & Keller, supra note 1, at 119–20 (discussing the dynamics of a bankruptcy auction
and the impact of credit bidding).
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argue that credit bidding “chill[s]” auctions.85 When prospective bidders
find themselves in competition with a credit bidder who has resources far
in excess of the current market value of the assets, the prospective bidders
may deem the cost of entering the auction not worth the substantial
likelihood of being outbid.86
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
The Supreme Court has recently resolved the split between the circuits
on the means by which a plan can be confirmed under § 1129 of the
Bankruptcy Code.87 The Seventh Circuit mandated a functional
classification of a plan in which the debtor may not restrict credit bidding
during an asset sale. It held that a plan that proposes to sell substantially all
of the debtor’s assets free of liens may not be confirmed under the
indubitable equivalent standard of § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) without granting the
creditors the right to credit bid.88 The Fifth Circuit and Third Circuit
granted the debtor the choice of restricting credit bidding during an asset
sale. They maintained that a plan that proposes to sell the debtor’s assets
may be confirmed under the indubitable equivalent standard without credit
bidding if the plan ensures the creditors will receive the indubitable
equivalent of their claim.89 The Supreme Court in RadLAX Gateway Hotel
affirmed the Seventh Circuit, holding that a plan that proposes to sell assets
free and clear of liens must be crammed down under subprovision (ii) and
presumptively permit credit bidding.90 This section will discuss the cases
that formed this split and how the judges involved are simultaneously
trying to adhere to the true meaning of § 1129(b), as well as provide
guidance that agrees with the commercial realities of a bankruptcy
proceeding.
A. In re The Pacific Lumber Co.
In re The Pacific Lumber Co.91 was the first case to hold that a plan
could be confirmed under § 1129 as fair and equitable with respect to a
85

Adam D. Marshall, Shifting Strategies for Secured Creditors: Credit Bidding as a Continuing
Strategic Option in Chapter 11 Cases, ASPATORE (Jan. 2011), 2011 WL 190431, at *3; see also Daniel
P. Winikka & Debra K. Simpson, Will Bankruptcy Courts Limit the Right to Credit Bid?, 17 NORTON J.
BANKR. L. & PRAC. 921, 924 (2008).
86
For further discussion on courts’ responses to the argument that credit bidding chills auctions,
and for a real case example demonstrating the chilling phenomenon, see infra Part III.A.
87
RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 132 S. Ct. 2065, 2072 (2012), aff’g River
Rd. Hotel Partners v. Amalgamated Bank, 651 F.3d 642 (7th Cir. 2011).
88
River Rd., 651 F.3d at 651.
89
In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 311 (3d Cir. 2010); Bank of N.Y. Trust Co. v.
Official Unsecured Creditors’ Comm. (In re The Pac. Lumber Co.), 584 F.3d 229, 247 (5th Cir. 2009).
90
RadLAX, 132 S. Ct. at 2073.
91
584 F.3d at 247, 249.
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dissenting class of creditors even if a sale of the creditor’s collateral did not
afford the opportunity to credit bid. This Chapter 11 proceeding concerned
a plan to restructure six affiliated entities all involved in the timber
business in California.92 After the restructuring, the principal creditor and a
key competitor would pay $580 million to satisfy the other creditors and
would own all of the assets of the business.93 All but two classes of
creditors approved the plan.94
To confirm the plan, the bankruptcy court proceeded to “cram down”
the plan on the dissenting creditors in accordance with § 1129(b).95 Proving
that the plan was fair and equitable required the court to value the assets
securing their claim. The bankruptcy court conducted a judicial valuation,
hearing “extensive valuation testimony over several days,” and concluded
the assets were worth “not more than $510 million.”96 The bankruptcy court
held that the valuation of $510 million in cash was the “indubitable
equivalent” of the creditors’ secured claim according to § 1129(b).97
The creditors appealed the bankruptcy court’s decision to the Fifth
Circuit, challenging that the plan was “not ‘fair and equitable’ because the
plan sold the [assets] without providing the [creditors] a right to credit
bid.”98 The creditors contended that since the plan proposed to sell the
assets, the plan must conform with the requirements of § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii),
granting the creditors the right to credit bid pursuant to § 363(k).99 The
creditors insisted that the ability to credit bid would protect them against
what they perceived to be an undervaluation of their collateral.100
In response, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that a reorganization plan may
be fair and equitable to a class of dissenting creditors if it provides the
creditors with the “indubitable equivalent” of their claim by any means.101
The court first determined the asset transfer was a sale, but held that
“because the three subsections of § 1129(b)(2)(A) are joined by the
disjunctive ‘or,’ they are alternatives,” and thus compliance with any one of
the subsections may permit a finding of “fair and equitable.”102 The court
also noted that the word “includes” in § 1129(b)(2) shows that the three
alternatives proposed for plan confirmation are not exhaustive and
92

Id. at 236–37.
Id.
94
Id. at 238.
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
Id.
98
Id. at 239.
99
Id. at 245.
100
Id. at 244.
101
Id. at 246.
102
Id. at 245.
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reiterated that “[e]ven a plan compliant with these alternative minimum
standards is not necessarily fair and equitable.”103 The court concluded that
confirming an asset sale under indubitable equivalence does not render
options (i) and (ii) superfluous as the standard of indubitable equivalence is
“no less demanding a standard than its companions.”104 The Fifth Circuit
scrutinized the valuation proceedings and determined they were not clearly
erroneous and represented a fair value of the creditor’s secured claim.105
Thus, according to the Fifth Circuit, § 1129 does not require the
opportunity to credit bid.
B. In re Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC
The Third Circuit was the next to confront this issue in In re
Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC.106 This case presented a similar situation in
which a proposed plan for the sale of assets free and clear of liens
prohibited the creditors from credit bidding at auction.107 Unlike In re The
Pacific Lumber Co., this plan proposed that the value of the debtors’ assets
be determined at the auction sale, rather than via a judicial process.108
Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC, a publishing company, filed for
Chapter 11 protection after defaulting on a $318 million loan secured by
substantially all of its assets.109 The debtors proposed a reorganization plan
whereby their assets would be sold free of liens at an all-cash public
auction, precluding the creditors from credit bidding.110 As proposed, the
plan would generate “$37 million in cash for the [l]enders,” plus the
lenders would receive a property “valued at $29.5 million, subject to a twoyear rent free lease.”111 If additional cash were raised at the auction, the
lenders would receive these proceeds.112
The lenders objected to the bid procedures, prompting the bankruptcy
court to issue an order refusing to restrict credit bidding at the auction.113
The bankruptcy court reasoned that although the plan was proceeding
under the § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) option of plan confirmation—the indubitable
equivalent prong—the plan was structured as a sale free and clear of liens
under § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) in every way except for the prohibition on credit
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
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bidding.114 According to the court, structuring the plan as a sale free and
clear of liens required it to proceed under § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii).115 The
bankruptcy court then modified the plan to permit credit bidding and the
debtors appealed to the district court, which reversed.116
On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed the district court, holding that
§ 1129(b) permits a bankruptcy court to confirm a plan so long as the
creditor will receive the “indubitable equivalent” of its claim.117 The Third
Circuit opined that the plain meaning of § 1129(b) is unambiguous, and as
a result the court must follow the statute’s language.118 The statute
purposefully employs the word “or,” which is defined in § 102(5) of the
Code.119 The Code defines “or” as nonexclusive, and a statutory note
dictates that “if a party ‘may do (a) or (b)’, then the party may do either or
both.”120 “The party is not limited to a mutually exclusive choice between
the two alternatives.”121
The Third Circuit further concluded that the specific method of
confirming a plan in § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) does not operate to limit the
broader language of (iii), and thus the canon of construction that the
“specific governs the general” is not applicable.122 Unlike In re The Pacific
Lumber Co., the Third Circuit did not analyze whether the debtors’
proposed plan satisfied indubitable equivalence, but merely said that a plan
proposing to sell collateral free and clear of liens at an all-cash auction
could satisfy the indubitable equivalent standard.123 The In re Philadelphia
Newspapers debtors proceeded with their plan of an all-cash auction and
yielded a significant financial benefit from restricting credit bidding.124
114

Id.
Id.
116
Id.
117
Id. at 304.
118
Id. at 305.
119
Id.
120
Id.
121
Id.
122
Id. at 307–08. The Supreme Court in RadLAX Gateway Hotel described how this canon would
apply to § 1129(b):
[T]he [general/specific] canon has full application . . . to statutes such as the one here, in which a
general authorization and a more limited, specific authorization exist side-by-side. . . . Here,
clause (ii) is a detailed provision that spells out the requirements for selling collateral free of liens,
while clause (iii) is a broadly worded provision that says nothing about such a sale. The
general/specific canon explains that the general language of clause (iii), although broad enough to
include it, will not be held to apply to a matter specifically dealt with in clause (ii).
RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 132 S. Ct. 2065, 2071–72 (2012) (internal
quotation marks omitted), aff’g River Rd. Hotel Partners v. Amalgamated Bank, 651 F.3d 642 (7th Cir.
2011).
123
In re Phila. Newspapers, 599 F.3d at 312–13.
124
See infra Part III.A.
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C. In re Philadelphia Newspapers Dissent by Judge Ambro
The majority opinion in In re Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC sparked
a thorough dissent by Judge Ambro, who argued that § 1129(b) is an
ambiguous statute necessitating an analysis of legislative history, statutory
context, and additional canons of statutory construction to choose between
two plausible interpretations.125 Judge Ambro first rejected the majority’s
conclusion that § 102(5) of the Bankruptcy Code defining “or” as “not
exclusive” means that the three subprovisions within § 1129 must be
nonexclusive.126 He cited to additional provisions of the Code—including
§§ 365(g)(2)(B)(i)–(ii), 506(d)(1)–(2), and 1112(b)(1)—where “or” is
interpreted to provide exclusive limitations.127 From this, Judge Ambro
concluded that the operative word in § 1129 is “provides,” not “includes,”
as the majority suggested.128
With emphasis on “provides” and a reading of “or” as exclusive, Judge
Ambro reasoned that “Congress did not list the three alternatives as routes
to cramdown confirmation that were universally applicable to any plan, but
instead as distinct routes that apply specific requirements depending on
how a given plan proposes to treat the claims of secured creditors.”129
Under this plausible reading of the statute, if a plan provides for a creditor
to retain liens on transferred property, it must follow clause (i). Similarly, if
the plan sells the property free and clear of liens, it must follow clause (ii).
And finally, only if the plan provides for something else not governed by
125

599 F.3d at 319 (Ambro, J., dissenting).
Id. at 324.
127
Id. See also Williams v. Tower Loan of Miss., Inc. (In re Williams), 168 F.3d 845, 847–48 (5th
Cir. 1999) (holding that § 1325(a)(5)(B) and (C) required an exclusive “or” construction to avoid
creating an option that Congress did not intend to create); 2 COLLIER, supra note 12, ¶ 102.06, at 102–
16 & n.1 (noting that reading “or” nonexclusively is only appropriate “if context and practicality allow”
and calling attention to § 1112(b) as an instance where “[i]t would be impossible for the court to do
both” of the statute’s alternatives).
128
In re Phila. Newspapers, 599 F.3d at 324–25 (Ambro, J., dissenting). The text of
§ 1129(b)(2)(A) reads:
With respect to a class of secured claims, the plan provides—
(i)(I) that the holders of such claims retain the liens securing such claims, whether the
property subject to such liens is retained by the debtor or transferred to another entity, to the
extent of the allowed amount of such claims; and
(II) that each holder of a claim of such class receive on account of such claim deferred cash
payments totaling at least the allowed amount of such claim, of a value, as of the effective date of
the plan, of at least the value of such holder’s interest in the estate’s interest in such property;
(ii) for the sale, subject to section 363(k) of this title, of any property that is subject to the
liens securing such claims, free and clear of such liens, with such liens to attach to the proceeds of
such sale, and the treatment of such liens on proceeds under clause (i) or (iii) of this
subparagraph; or
(iii) for the realization by such holders of the indubitable equivalent of such claims.
11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A) (2006).
129
In re Phila. Newspapers, 599 F.3d at 325 (Ambro, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
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either clause (i) or (ii) may it follow the indubitable equivalent standard of
clause (iii).130 Judge Ambro concluded that since the debtors’ plan proposes
to sell the collateral free and clear of liens, it must follow clause (ii) and
presumptively permit the creditors to credit bid up to the full value of their
claim at auction.131 He then analyzed the credit bidding right of § 1129 in
conjunction with §§ 1111(b)132 and 363(k)133 to conclude that these sections
are “part of a comprehensive arrangement enacted by Congress to avoid the
pitfalls of undervaluation, regardless of the mechanism chosen.”134 Judge
Ambro closed by analyzing the practical impact of failing to allow secured
parties to credit bid when they rely upon it. He opined that it would likely
raise the cost of capital as creditors must account for the likelihood of
undervaluation.135
D. River Road Hotel Partners
The most recent circuit to weigh in on the credit bidding debate was
the Seventh Circuit in River Road Hotel Partners v. Amalgamated Bank.136
The debtors in this case were in the business of constructing airport hotels
and had voluntarily filed for Chapter 11 protection after construction costs
greatly exceeded their expectations.137 The debtors filed a reorganization
plan that proposed to sell substantially all of their assets without permitting
the creditors to credit bid and without having the bankruptcy court
judicially value the assets in advance of the sale.138 The lead creditor
objected to this plan, forcing the debtors to request confirmation under
prong (iii) of § 1129(b)(2)(A).139 The bankruptcy court refused to confirm
the plan without granting the creditors the right to credit bid, citing Judge
Ambro’s dissent in In re Philadelphia Newspapers, and the debtors
appealed the case directly to the Seventh Circuit.140
The Seventh Circuit, affirming the bankruptcy court, reasoned that
“there are two plausible interpretations of the” plain language of
§ 1129(b)(2)(A) and the ambiguity required an analysis of canons of
130

Id. at 326–27.
Id. at 330–33.
132
11 U.S.C. § 1111(b) allows an undersecured, nonrecourse creditor to elect secured recourse
treatment unless its collateral is sold through § 363(k) or pursuant to a plan. See supra Part I.B.
133
11 U.S.C. § 363(k) grants a presumptive right to credit bid when assets are sold outside of the
ordinary course of business.
134
In re Phila. Newspapers, 599 F.3d at 334 (Ambro, J., dissenting).
135
Id. at 337.
136
651 F.3d 642 (7th Cir. 2011), aff’d sub nom. RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated
Bank, 132 S. Ct. 2065 (2012).
137
Id. at 643–44.
138
Id. at 645.
139
Id.
140
Id. at 645, 647.
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construction and statutory context to choose the more plausible option.141 It
found Judge Ambro’s statutory analysis in In re Philadelphia Newspapers
compelling, and also pointed out an inconsistency that would arise between
methods of valuation supported by the Code if the debtors’ argument were
followed.142 The court noted that the Code “recognizes two basic
mechanisms for solving these types of valuation problems: judicial
valuation of an asset’s value, 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1), and free market
valuation of an asset’s value as established in an open auction, 11 U.S.C.
§§ 363(k), 1129(b)(2)(A).”143 The court reasoned that because both
§§ 363(k) and 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) contain a presumptive right to credit bid
when collateral value is determined at an open auction, any sale of
collateral in which the value is to be determined at auction should
presumptively include a right to credit bid.144 To hold that creditors have
the right to credit bid during an auction sale of assets under § 363(k) but do
not have the right to credit bid during an auction sale under
§ 1129(b)(2)(A) would create inconsistency within the Bankruptcy Code.145
Based on this analysis, the Seventh Circuit became the first circuit to
hold that a § 1129 plan that proposes to sell “encumbered assets free and
clear of liens at an auction [must] satisfy the requirements set forth in
Subsection (ii) of the statute.”146 This holding conflicts with the Third
Circuit in In re Philadelphia Newspapers; however, it is potentially
reconcilable with the Fifth Circuit in In re The Pacific Lumber Co. As the
Seventh Circuit noted, there are two ways to determine collateral value
during a bankruptcy proceeding: (1) judicial valuation or (2) valuation by
auction.147 In In re The Pacific Lumber Co., the collateral’s value was
determined judicially, and thus the judge verified indubitable equivalence
in advance of plan confirmation.148
E. RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank
The Supreme Court in RadLAX Gateway Hotel resolved the circuit
split and affirmed the Seventh Circuit in a brief opinion by Justice Scalia.149
Without justification, the Court deemed the text of § 1129(b)(2)(A)

141

Id. at 643, 649–51.
Id. at 649–50.
143
Id. at 650.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 653.
147
Id. at 650.
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See supra text accompanying notes 96–97.
149
RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 132 S. Ct. 2065, 2068, 2073 (2012),
aff’g River Rd. Hotel Partners v. Amalgamated Bank, 651 F.3d 642 (7th Cir. 2011).
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unambiguous150 and yet called the debtor’s interpretation—permitting a
plan to satisfy any subsection per the use of the disjunctive “or”—
“hyperliteral and contrary to common sense.”151 In the Supreme Court’s
“unambiguous” reading, what the plan proposes to do governs the
provision under which it must be confirmed.152 The Court asserted that
“[a]s a matter of law, no bid procedures like the ones proposed here [an
auction sale free and clear of liens without credit bidding] could satisfy the
requirements of § 1129(b)(2)(A).”153 The Court concluded this by resorting
to a common canon of statutory construction: “the specific governs the
general.”154 Curiously, however, the Court did not analyze additional
textual indications,155 and deemed analyzing the general statutory purpose
or pre-Code practices as appropriate only if the text were ambiguous.156
The Supreme Court did not explain why it employed a canon of
statutory construction if the text is unambiguous, nor did it explain why the
interpretation might be swayed by textual indications157 but not by
analyzing the general statutory purpose or pre-Code practices.158 The Court
concluded by asserting that the merits of credit bidding, argued extensively
by the parties and on both sides of the circuit split, “are for the
consideration of Congress, not the courts.”159 Unfortunately, in doing so the
Court unnecessarily limited the cramdown options available to the
bankruptcy courts, essentially doing away with an alternative method of
plan valuation and fostering aggressive lending strategies harmful to the
rehabilitation of businesses. The impact of the RadLAX decision on
businesses will be explored more fully in the remainder of this Note.
III. RESTRICTING CREDIT BIDDING IS AN EFFECTIVE TOOL TO COMBAT
AGGRESSIVE LENDER STRATEGIES
Contrary to the Supreme Court’s holding to require credit bidding,
granting debtors and courts the choice to prohibit credit bidding would
permit needed flexibility in a Chapter 11 proceeding. Even if judicial
valuation can satisfy the indubitable equivalent standard, should courts
150

Id. at 2073.
Id. at 2070.
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Id. at 2073.
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Id.
154
Id. at 2071 (quoting Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 384 (1992)).
155
Id. at 2072. The Supreme Court did not define the phrase “textual indications,” but the opinion
suggests that the Court used this phrase to refer to an analysis of statutory context in order to shine light
on statutory meaning.
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Id. at 2073.
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See id. at 2072.
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restrict credit bidding? The Supreme Court declined to discuss this policy,
noting, “the pros and cons of credit-bidding are for the consideration of
Congress, not the courts.”160 In so doing, the Supreme Court missed an
opportunity to curtail an abusive bankruptcy practice that is currently
stifling the rehabilitation of businesses.161
To illustrate how credit bidding chills auctions and how opportunistic
investors influence the bankruptcy process, we will revisit our earlier
example of a $100 million loan secured by a $50 million apartment
complex.162 Debtor hosts an auction sale of the apartment complex in order
to pay back Creditor; however, Creditor has already sold its debt on the
secondary market to Hedge Fund for $30 million. Hedge Fund desires to
own and manage the apartment complex, believing that it will ultimately
generate a profit from the enterprise. Debtor tries to recruit Bidder to enter
the auction to bid for the apartment complex; however, Bidder knows from
the early stages of his due diligence that Hedge Fund has a credit bid of
$100 million and believes Hedge Fund desires to own the assets. Bidder is
unwilling to spend additional money to investigate the potential apartment
complex enterprise because Bidder assumes that he will be outbid by
Hedge Fund’s credit bid. As a result, Bidder and many other potential
bidders never enter the auction, making Hedge Fund likely to win with a
credit bid. Since Hedge Fund’s bid establishes the “value” of the most
senior lender’s claim (the loan it purchased for $30 million), all of the
junior lenders and creditors will yield nothing from the sale.
In recent bankruptcy auctions, lenders are using credit bidding as an
offensive tool for strategic investors who wish to own the bankrupt entity
with the goal of making a profit in the long term.163 These investors buy
discounted debt on the secondary marketthey purchase debt from the
original credit holders for less than the face value of the repayment
obligationand credit bid up to the full value of the debt to purchase the
assets of the company. Investors using such tactics take advantage of the
current depression in asset value and bet on the upside potential of an
entity.164 Giving debtors the choice to pursue judicial valuation can help to
remedy this problem.

160

Id.
See supra note 85 and accompanying text. For a comprehensive discussion of the arguments for
credit bidding, see Buccola & Keller, supra note 1, at 117–22.
162
See supra Part I.C.
163
See Amy L. Kyle, Recent Trends in Asset Sales Under the Bankruptcy Code, in TRENDS IN
COMMERCIAL BANKRUPTCY FILINGS 55, 58 (2010), available at 2010 WL 3650163, at *2.
164
See id.
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A. The In re Philadelphia Newspapers Auction
Despite debtors’ continued insistence,165 courts have been somewhat
unresponsive to the argument that credit bidding chills auctions. Judge
Ambro famously wrote in In re Philadelphia Newspapers: “Although some
may argue that credit bidding chills cash bidding, that argument
underwhelms; credit bidding chills cash bidding no more than a deeppocketed cash bidder would chill less-well-capitalized cash bidders.”166
While Judge Ambro may have been underwhelmed by the argument, the
financial results of the In re Philadelphia Newspapers asset sale presented
a unique case study of how credit bidding can, and did, chill an auction
proceeding.
The original In re Philadelphia Newspapers plan proposed to restrict
credit bidding and conduct an all-cash auction. The bankruptcy court
denied this plan.167 Based on the bankruptcy court’s ruling, the initial
prospective bidders assumed credit bidding would be permitted at auction.
There were seven total parties interested in bidding during this time.168
After the district court reversed the bankruptcy court and confirmed
the all-cash auction plan, the number of interested parties jumped to
fourteen,169 and then rose again to twenty-nine in the weeks before the
Third Circuit rendered its opinion affirming the district court.170 No longer
faced with the threat of a $300 million credit bid, the market responded to
an all-cash auction by showing a four-fold increase in the number of
bidders.171 The original In re Philadelphia Newspapers lenders won the
auction with a cash bid of $139 million.172 This equated to “thirty-three
cents on the dollar,” a remarkable sum considering the senior debt was
trading in the secondary market for “twenty cents on the dollar” for much
of the duration of the bankruptcy case.173
Restricting credit bidding in the In re Philadelphia Newspapers asset
sale fostered a more active and more competitive auction environment,
supporting the argument that a $300 million credit bid had dissuaded
bidders. The all-cash auction caused more bidders to enter with more
aggressive bids.174 The final auction price was higher than anticipated
165

See Marshall, supra note 85; Winikka & Simpson, supra note 85.
In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 321 (3d Cir. 2010) (Ambro, J., dissenting).
167
Id. at 301–02 (majority opinion).
168
Lawrence G. McMichael et al., Quick Sales and Credit Bids (ABI 6th Annual Mid-Atlantic
Bankruptcy Workshop, Aug. 5–7, 2010), WL 080510 ABI-CLE 285.
169
Id.
170
Id.
171
See id.
172
Id.
173
Id.
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Id.
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during the pendency of the bankruptcy case.175 Had a third party won the
auction, the cash value received by the creditors would have likely
supported a finding of indubitable equivalence.176
B. Restricting Speculative Credit Bidding Promotes Effective Debtor
Rehabilitation
The recent economic downturn has fostered a Chapter 11 environment
that is witnessing an increase in aggressive credit bidding strategies.177 The
secondary market for secured debt is trading at highly discounted values,178
and the purchasers of this debt believe they can influence the bankruptcy
process to derive a profit from these claims.179 Additionally, the
unavailability of capital is pushing many potential Chapter 11
reorganizations to resolve themselves with fast asset sales under § 363
followed by a liquidation plan.180
As traditional lenders declined to provide financing to distressed
entities,
nontraditional
lendersprimarily
specialized
hedge
fundssupplied credit, purchasing discounted debt from larger lenders and
providing debtor financing through the Chapter 11 reorganization.181 These
nontraditional lenders are speculating on the future appreciation of the debt,
either through a fast asset sale, or through the ownership, management, and
subsequent sale of the reorganized entity.182 The ability to credit bid up to
the full face value of a claim virtually assures the nontraditional lender will
emerge as the owner of the reorganized entity.183 If the investor does not
175

Id.
See id.
177
See Jonathan S. Covin & Brant C. Martin, Kicking the Can Down the Road: Understanding the
Current State of Commercial Bankruptcy Trends and Strategies, in NAVIGATING RECENT BANKRUPTCY
LAW TRENDS 75, 78–80 (2010), available at 2010 WL 4735522, at *4.
178
David Line Batty, Necessity Is the Mother of Innovation During the Credit Crisis, 14 N.C.
BANKING INST. 1, 14 (2010).
179
Richard D. Thomas, Comment, Tipping the Scales in Chapter 11: How Distressed Debt
Investors Decrease Debtor Leverage and the Efficacy of Business Reorganization, 27 EMORY BANKR.
DEV. J. 213, 217–18 (2010) (discussing how distressed debt investors purchase debt positions in
bankruptcy expecting to make a profit through the reorganization).
180
See Covin & Martin, supra note 177, at 76–77.
181
See David Peress & Thomas C. Prinzhorn, Nontraditional Lenders and the Impact of Loan-toOwn Strategies on the Restructuring Process, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Apr. 2006, at 48.
182
See id.
183
See Covin & Martin, supra note 177. Assets sold pursuant to a § 363 sale, or in accordance with
a plan, are permitted under certain circumstances to be sold “free and clear” of liens, granting the
investors clear title to the assets. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (2006); id. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii). Additionally,
when bankruptcy courts approve orders to sell all of the debtor’s assets they “frequently include
provisions that protect the purchaser from any subsequent fraudulent transfer claims based on the theory
that the purchaser bought the assets from the debtor for less than ‘reasonably equivalent value.’” Covin
& Martin, supra note 177, at 78.
176
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win the auction with a face-value bid, his lien will attach to the proceeds of
the auction,184 granting him the value of the security’s rapid appreciation.
The presence of these nontraditional lenders complicates a Chapter 11
asset sale by shifting the incentives of the bidders at auction. When
traditional lenders approach a bankruptcy auction, their goal is to recoup as
much of their loan as possible.185 Nontraditional lenders, on the other hand,
have the express goal of owning the assets after the reorganization, and will
credit bid the full face value of their claima value in excess of the market
value of the assets for an undersecured claimin order to secure their
ownership interest.186 While a nontraditional lender may have to pay
additional cash to the estate to satisfy a superior lien, administrative
expenses, or both, the result of this reorganization typically leaves the
subordinated and “unsecured creditors with little or no recovery.”187
Nontraditional lenders employing these aggressive credit bidding
techniques are betting on collateral appreciation—the upside potential. As
noted in In re The Pacific Lumber Co., “[t]he Bankruptcy Code . . . does
not protect a secured creditor’s upside potential; it protects the ‘allowed
secured claim.’ If a creditor were over-secured, it could not demand to keep
its collateral rather than be paid in full simply to protect the ‘upside
potential.’”188 A judicial valuation of the debtor’s collateral would fix the
asset price at the current market value—the “allowed amount” of secured
claims.189 This valuation would provide the creditor with the indubitable
equivalent of its claim, and a sale price in excess of this value would
benefit the rest of the estate.190 This procedure would bring a sale of assets
pursuant to a plan more in line with the Chapter 11 purpose of
rehabilitation and reorganization.

184

§ 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii).
See Peress & Prinzhorn, supra note 181.
186
See Robert J. Keach et al., Resolved: Loan-to-Own DIP Lenders Should Not Be Allowed to
Credit Bid (ABI 25th Annual Spring Meeting, Apr. 15–17, 2007), WL 041207 ABI-CLE 85; Kyle,
supra note 163.
187
See Keach, supra note 186.
188
Bank of N.Y. Trust Co. v. Official Unsecured Creditors’ Comm. (In re The Pac. Lumber Co.),
584 F.3d 229, 247 (5th Cir. 2009).
189
§ 1129(b)(2)(A)(i). See also supra Part I.B (discussing the process of valuation).
190
See § 1129(b)(2)(B) (dictating that the plan of reorganization must provide for the senior
creditor to be paid in full to the allowed amount of its claim before a creditor with an interest junior to
the dissenting senior creditor may receive anything under the plan). Fixing the allowed amount of a
secured creditor’s claim via a judicial valuation would satisfy the requirement that a secured creditor be
paid in full, permitting recovery for junior creditors of the estate. See In re The Pac. Lumber Co., 584
F.3d at 238, 244, 248 (permitting a judicial valuation to determine the indubitable equivalent of a
creditor’s claim).
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IV. COURTS MAY USE THE INDUBITABLE EQUIVALENT STANDARD TO
CRAM DOWN ASSET SALE PLANS THAT RESTRICT CREDIT BIDDING
The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the cramdown provision of the
Bankruptcy Code not only promotes improper policy, but also promotes
inconsistency within the Code. Consistent interpretation between §§ 363
(granting creditors adequate protection against collateral devaluation)
and 1129(b) (ensuring creditors are properly compensated when a plan is
crammed down against their will) suggests that the Supreme Court should
have interpreted the cramdown provision to grant more flexibility in plan
design. A proper interpretation of § 1129(b) would permit plans to restrict
credit bidding in bankruptcy auctions so long as the creditors are paid the
value of their claim as determined judicially.191
Judge Ambro’s dissent in In re Philadelphia Newspapers and the
Seventh Circuit in River Road stress that the interpretation of an ambiguous
statute would be incomplete without referring to the provision’s legislative
history;192 however, the Supreme Court did not conduct this analysis.193 The
Senate Report addressing § 1129 confirms that the standard of indubitable
equivalence is intended to follow the approach provided by Judge Hand’s
opinion in In re Murel Holding Corp.194 Judge Hand stressed the flexibility
granted to judges in crafting a solution under the indubitable equivalence
subprovision.195 He noted that in the cramdown context, providing the
secured creditor with the indubitable equivalent of his claim is not “a
‘method’ at all; it merely gives power generally to the judge . . . to
‘provide . . . adequate protection,’ when the other methods are not
chosen.”196 The bankruptcy judge has the discretion to determine whether
adequate protection is satisfied.197
The floor debates remind us that the § 1129(b) list of factors that could
satisfy the fair and equitable requirement of cramming down are
nonexclusive, stressing that “[a]lthough many of the factors interpreting
191

But see Jason S. Brookner, Pacific Lumber and Philadelphia Newspapers: The Eradication of a
Carefully Constructed Statutory Regime Through Misinterpretation of Section 1129(b)(2)(A) of the
Bankruptcy Code, 85 AM. BANKR. L.J. 127, 146–47 (2011) for an argument that paying a lender the
judicial valuation of its collateral does not provide it with the indubitable equivalent of its claim.
192
See River Rd. Hotel Partners v. Amalgamated Bank, 651 F.3d 642, 649–50, 652 n.8 (7th Cir.
2011), aff’d sub nom. RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 132 S. Ct. 2065 (2012); In
re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 319 (3d Cir. 2010) (Ambro, J., dissenting).
193
RadLAX, 132 S. Ct. at 2071–72 (applying only “the specific governs the general” and the
antisuperfluity canons of statutory interpretation).
194
S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 127 (1978).
195
Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Murel Holding Corp. (In re Murel Holding Corp.), 75 F.2d 941, 942 (2d
Cir. 1935). See also supra notes 60–66 and accompanying text (discussing the two ways to calculate the
value of collateral).
196
In re Murel Holding Corp., 75 F.2d at 942.
197
Id.
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‘fair and equitable’ are specified in paragraph (2), others . . . were omitted
from the House amendment to avoid statutory complexity.”198 They also
dictate that a plan may be crammed down if any of the three subprovisions
are satisfied, including the more general provision of indubitable
equivalence.199
Floor debates discussing § 1129 note that the sale provision of
subsection (ii)—providing for a sale free and clear of liens subject to credit
bidding—is “self explanatory.”200 In clarifying the indubitable equivalent
standard of § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii), the floor debates note that “[a]bandonment
of the collateral to the creditor” and “a lien on similar collateral” could
qualify as the indubitable equivalent of the creditor’s claim.201 The
legislative history does not restrict subsection (iii) to nonsale situations, nor
does it explicitly permit it.202 In order to add additional clarity to the
meaning of the statute, we must now look to the statutory context within
the Bankruptcy Code.
A. The Similarity Between §§ 361 and 1129(b) Strongly Suggests that
They Should Be Interpreted Consistently
Before the Supreme Court’s decision in RadLAX, the circuit split
hinged on the ambiguity (or lack thereof) of § 1129(b). Because the Third
and Fifth Circuits determined that the statute is clear on its face, they held
that the disjunctive “or” meant a plan may satisfy the indubitable
equivalent prong regardless of how the plan is structured.203 The Seventh
Circuit determined that the statute is ambiguous, and used legislative
history, statutory context, and policy concerns to hold that a plan may
satisfy the indubitable equivalent prong only if the plan is not structured in
one of the other two ways provided by the statute.204
The Supreme Court, on the other hand, found “no textual ambiguity”
within the statute.205 However, rather than looking only to the text of the
“unambiguous” statute in order to discern its meaning, the Court reiterated
that analyzing statutory context or other “textual indications” can add
clarity to the meaning of a statute and overcome the canon of construction
presuming the “specific governs the general.”206 The Supreme Court
198

124 CONG. REC. 32,407 (1978).
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See supra notes 102–04, 118–21 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 141–46 and accompanying text.
205
RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 132 S. Ct. 2065, 2073 (2012), aff’g River
Rd. Hotel Partners v. Amalgamated Bank, 651 F.3d 642 (7th Cir. 2011).
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Id. at 2071–72.
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asserted that no textual indications were present in the Bankruptcy Code to
justify a departure from this canon of construction.207
Despite thorough contextual analyses, neither the Third, Fifth, or
Seventh Circuits, nor the Supreme Court, analyzed § 1129(b) in
conjunction with § 361, the section of the Bankruptcy Code that provides
the means to grant a creditor adequate protection during the pendency of a
bankruptcy proceeding.208 Even if courts assume § 1129 is ambiguous,
consistent interpretation of § 1129(b) with § 361 requires courts to
conclude that a plan may satisfy the indubitable equivalent prong of
§ 1129(b) regardless of the plan’s structure. Due to their substantial
similarity, analyzing § 1129 in conjunction with § 361 can add clarity to
the meaning of § 1129. When discussing the interpretation of the
Bankruptcy Code, one judge noted: “Consistency in the meaning of
language in a statute—and most certainly that of words of art—is not only
a virtue, it is a hallmark of faithful statutory construction.”209
Section 361 dictates alternate means of granting creditors adequate
protection against devaluation of their collateral during a bankruptcy
proceeding.210 The format, purpose, language, and history of § 361 are
remarkably similar to § 1129, and should give clarity to Congress’s desired
interpretation of § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)–(iii). Furthermore, due to the
similarities between these sections, interpreting them differently promotes
undesirable inconsistency within the Bankruptcy Code.
Section 361 provides for three means by which a creditor can receive
adequate protection. The section dictates:
When adequate protection is required[,] . . . such adequate protection may
be provided by(1) requiring the trustee to make a cash payment or periodic
cash payments to such entity, to the extent that [the Chapter 11 process]
results in a decrease in the value of [the collateral]; (2) providing to such
entity an additional or replacement lien to the extent that [the Chapter 11
process] results in a decrease in the value of [the collateral]; or (3) granting
such other relief, . . . as will result in the realization by such entity of the
indubitable equivalent of [the collateral].211
207

Id. at 2072.
11 U.S.C. § 361 (2006).
209
United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd. (In re Timbers of Inwood
Forest Assocs., Ltd.), 808 F.2d 363, 378 (5th Cir. 1987) (Jones, J., dissenting) (discussing the
importance of consistent interpretation between types of proposals that can satisfy the standard of
indubitable equivalence under §§ 361 and 1129), aff’d, 484 U.S. 365 (1988). Accord In re Hoff, 54 B.R.
746, 753–54 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1985) (comparing the standard of indubitable equivalence given in § 1129
with the standard of indubitable equivalence in § 361 and concluding that the proposed method of
reorganization did not satisfy the § 1129 indubitable equivalence standard because it did not satisfy the
§ 361 indubitable equivalence standard).
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§ 361.
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These options are consistent with the cramdown options provided in
§ 1129(b)(2)(A). Both sections dictate that the subprovisions are
nonexclusive.212 Sections 361(1) and 1129(b)(2)(A)(i) both permit a debtor
to protect a creditor’s claim by making periodic cash payments to the
creditor to compensate it for the full value of its claim.213 Section 361(2)
highlights the debtor’s option of granting “an additional or replacement lien
to the extent” the creditor’s collateral has depreciated in value.214 This
§ 361 provision is analogous to the means of cramming down a plan
suggested by the legislative history of § 1129(b), proposing that “a lien on
similar collateral” would satisfy indubitable equivalence.215
The legislative history surrounding § 361 notes that a court may
provide adequate protection by “permitting a secured creditor to bid in his
claim at the sale of the property and to offset the claim against the price bid
in.”216 This method is nearly identical to § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii), which
provides for a sale of the debtors’ assets with a presumptive right to credit
bid.217 Finally, both §§ 361 and 1129(b) include a catchall provision
requiring the lenders to receive the “indubitable equivalent” of their interest
in the entity’s property.218 This indubitable equivalent standard grants the
bankruptcy court sufficient flexibility to confirm a reorganization plan or a
method of providing adequate protection that precisely satisfies the
circumstances of the case.
In order to promote uniform interpretation of similar provisions
throughout the Bankruptcy Code, the Supreme Court should have
interpreted § 1129’s cramdown provision consistently with precedential
interpretation of the means of granting adequate protection in § 361. A
review of § 361 interpretations reveals two important conclusions that
should also apply to courts’ interpretation of § 1129: (1) the subprovisions
are not exclusive and (2) what the debtor proposes to do does not govern
the provision under which its plan must be confirmed.
Courts frequently approve means of granting adequate protection that
are not listed within the text of § 361, which shows that the subprovisions
212

Id. (noting that “such adequate protection may be provided by” several mechanisms (emphasis
added)); id. § 1129(b)(2) (“[T]he condition that a plan be fair and equitable with respect to a class
includes the following requirements . . . .” (emphasis added)).
213
Id. § 361(1) (“[R]equiring the trustee to make a cash payment or periodic cash payments to such
entity, to the extent that [the Chapter 11 process] results in a decrease in the value of [the
collateral] . . . .”); id. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II) (dictating “that each holder of a claim . . . receive . . .
deferred cash payments totaling at least the allowed amount of such claim, of a value, as of the effective
date of the plan, of at least the value of [the collateral]”).
214
Id. § 361(2).
215
124 CONG. REC. 32,407 (1978).
216
H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 340 (1977).
217
§ 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii).
218
See id. § 361(3); id. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii).
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are not exclusive. The most common nonstatutory means of adequate
protection is the existence of an equity cushion. An equity cushion exists
when a creditor is oversecured.219 Since the purpose of providing adequate
protection according to § 361 is to protect the creditor from a decline in the
value of its collateral,220 if the collateral has a present value sufficiently in
excess of the creditor’s claim, courts are willing to deem that creditor
adequately protected.221 Courts can also find adequate protection through a
combination of restrictions on the debtor’s use of cash collateral to operate
the business, reporting requirements imposed upon the debtor,222 and thirdparty guarantees.223
In addition, courts regularly confirm plans that propose to combine
methods of providing adequate protection.224 The acceptance of these plans
shows that the debtor’s proposed method of granting adequate protection
(what the plan provides) does not govern the provision of the section under
which it must be confirmed.225 A proposal that uses a method listed in the
statute combined with a method not listed in the statute does not make the
proposal invalid; instead, courts analyze the proposal under the indubitable
equivalent prong to determine whether it provides adequate protection.226
Courts approve plans calling for periodic cash payments (permitted by
§ 361(1)) in addition to replacement liens on property (provided for in
§ 361(2)).227 Additionally, courts do not require the debtor to make periodic
cash payments if an appointed trustee makes them instead.228 Combining an
equity cushion with periodic cash payments is another popular

219

2 BANKRUPTCY DESK GUIDE § 21:39 (2007).
See, e.g., In re Mosello, 195 B.R. 277, 288 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996) (quoting In re 495 Cent.
Park Ave. Corp., 136 B.R. 626, 631 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992)); Barclays Bank of N.Y. v. Saypol (In re
Saypol), 31 B.R. 796, 800 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983) (“[T]he legislative history confirms that adequate
protection centers on protection of a secured creditor from suffering a decline in the value of the
collateral during the bankruptcy proceeding.”).
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alternative.229 In analyzing plans proposing a mixture of methods, courts do
not discuss whether the method proposed exactly conforms to the
subprovisions of § 361 but, rather, focus on whether the debtor’s proposal
provides the creditor with the indubitable equivalent of its claim.
That treatment of § 361 runs contrary to how the Supreme Court and
the Seventh Circuit in River Road, and Judge Ambro’s dissent in In re
Philadelphia Newspapers, read the word provides in § 1129(b). They
dictate that a plan should be crammed down according to the subprovision
that is most similar to the plan’s proposed action.230 Like § 1129(b), § 361
also uses the term “provides.” When a court determines adequate protection
to be necessary, § 361 reads, “such adequate protection may be provided
by”231 and then lists three options. This wording is essentially identical to
§ 1129(b), which reads, “the condition that a plan be fair and equitable with
respect to a class includes the following requirements: (A) With respect to
a class of secured claims, the plan provides,” followed by the three
cramdown subprovisions.232 Surely with Code provisions this similar, a
mere difference in the tense of the verb “to provide” does not create a
different statutory meaning.
Until the decision of River Road, courts’ treatment of § 1129 mirrored
their treatment of § 361. Plans of reorganization that proposed a
combination of statutorily provided means and novel means were
confirmed
under
the
indubitable
equivalent
standard
of
§ 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii).233 A common reorganization plan accepted under the
indubitable equivalent standard of § 1129 proposes to completely abandon
collateral to the creditor in satisfaction of its debt.234 A subset of this
method is the “dirt for debt” plan that proposes to surrender a portion of the

229

See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Monnier (In re Monnier Bros.), 755 F.2d 1336, 1340
(8th Cir. 1985).
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RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 132 S. Ct. 2065, 2073 (2012), aff’g River
Rd. Hotel Partners v. Amalgamated Bank, 651 F.3d 642 (7th Cir. 2011); see also River Rd., 651 F.3d at
652; In re Phila. Newspapers, 599 F.3d at 326–27 (Ambro, J., dissenting). Accord Brookner, supra note
191, at 136–37.
231
11 U.S.C. § 361 (2006) (emphasis added).
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Id. § 1129(b)(2) (emphasis added).
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See, e.g., In re Atlanta S. Bus. Park, Ltd., 173 B.R. 444, 449 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1994) (“A plan
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equivalent of its claim).
234
See, e.g., Sandy Ridge Dev. Corp. v. La. Nat’l Bank (In re Sandy Ridge Dev. Corp.), 881 F.2d
1346, 1354 (5th Cir. 1989); In re Hardy Mach., No. 93-80633, 1994 WL 722084 (Bankr. N.D. Ala.
Dec. 16, 1994).
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debtor’s assets to a secured creditor in satisfaction of the creditor’s claim.235
In another variation, the plan proposes to satisfy either all or a portion of
the creditor’s claim with a lien on substitute collateral.236
All of these plans require the court to judicially value both the initial
collateral and the replacement collateral to ensure the creditor is receiving
the indubitable equivalent of its claim. In certain circumstances, a court
may subordinate a replacement lien if the value of the collateral securing
the primary and secondary lien is sufficient to cover both claims.237 Courts
are just as receptive to plans proposing a number of options; as one court
has noted: “[T]here is no prohibition on a debtor using several methods to
provide a secured creditor with the indubitable equivalent of its claim.
Courts have routinely allowed combinations of cash payments, payments
over time, abandonment of collateral, and substitution of collateral.”238 The
Supreme Court’s decision changes this history, requiring a plan to conform
to the subprovision to which it is most similar.239 This reduces the
flexibility relied upon by bankruptcy courts to confirm nontraditional plans
that offer creditors the indubitable equivalent of their claims.
Section 1129(b) of the Bankruptcy Code should be interpreted
consistently with § 361 to grant nonexclusive means of providing fair and
equitable treatment to dissenting creditors. Historical treatment of both
§§ 361 and 1129 shows routine use of nonstatutory means of providing
adequate protection and fair and equitable treatment, echoing legislative
history promoting the “not exclusive” nature of the sections.240 Debtors
routinely propose plans that utilize a mixture of statutory means—either
with nonstatutory or other statutory means—showing that what the plan
proposes to do does not govern the provision under which it must be
confirmed.
Additionally, consistent interpretation of the statute demands more
than granting like terms the same meaning in different parts of the statute—
235

See, e.g., Arnold & Baker Farms v. United States (In re Arnold & Baker Farms), 85 F.3d 1415,
1423–24 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting that a partial distribution of collateral could satisfy the indubitable
equivalent standard even though the particular plan before the court did not); In re Bannerman
Holdings, LLC, No. 10-01053-SWH, 2010 WL 4260003, at *1, *6 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Oct. 20, 2010); In
re May, 174 B.R. at 840.
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See, e.g., Brite v. Sun Country Dev., Inc. (In re Sun Country Dev., Inc.), 764 F.2d 406, 408–09
(5th Cir. 1985).
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See, e.g., Woods v. Pine Mountain, Ltd. (In re Pine Mountain, Ltd.), 80 B.R. 171, 174–75
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1987).
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In re Bryant, 439 B.R. 724, 747 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2010); see also id. (assessing the debtor’s
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payments over time to satisfy the remainder of the claim).
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240
See supra notes 198–99 and accompanying text.

1912

107:1881 (2013)

Betting on the Upside

one must also interpret the substance of the provisions consistently. Section
361 ensures that creditors are treated fairly and their rights to the value of
their collateral are respected. It provides specific examples of ways to
ensure creditors are treated fairly, but also permits courts to use their own
discretion to craft equitable remedies. The primary focus of § 1129(b) is to
provide a means to confirm a plan of reorganization despite the objection
of creditors; however, § 1129 ensures that we protect the interests of these
creditors and only confirm plans that are fair. As the primary concern of
§ 361 is fairness to creditors, courts should look to § 361 to help illuminate
the fairness of the plans under § 1129.
Consistent interpretation of §§ 361 and 1129(b) strongly supports the
conclusion that a plan proposing to sell a creditor’s collateral free and clear
of liens without permitting credit bidding may be confirmed under the
indubitable equivalent prong as long as the plan provides the creditors with
the indubitable equivalent of their claims. While both In re Philadelphia
Newspapers and In re The Pacific Lumber Co. reached this conclusion,
only In re The Pacific Lumber Co. took the necessary step of evaluating the
proposed plan to confirm that it satisfied the standard of indubitable
equivalence.241 The Supreme Court argues that “[a]s a matter of law, no bid
procedures like the ones proposed [in the RadLAX plan] could satisfy the
requirements of § 1129(b)(2)(A).”242 By making this assertion, the Supreme
Court unnecessarily restricts valuation during a sale to valuation by auction
with credit bidding, when the Bankruptcy Code clearly also permits judicial
valuation.243 The bankruptcy court should retain the discretion to permit
either valuation by auction or judicial valuation. With judicial valuation,
not only can the bid procedures provide for the indubitable equivalent of a
claim, they may offer a far better approximation of the current market
value.
B. A Judicially Valued Asset Sale Plan Satisfies Indubitable Equivalence
The indubitable equivalent provision can apply to plans proposing to
sell assets at auction without credit bidding; however, just because it is
permitted to apply does not mean the proposed plan will satisfy the high
standards of indubitable equivalence. Courts must be stringent in their
analysis of the creditor’s return under the proposed plan to ensure that it
provides the indubitable equivalent of the creditor’s claim. Rather than
remanding for a factual determination, RadLAX concluded as a matter of

241

Bank of N.Y. Trust Co. v. Official Unsecured Creditors’ Comm. (In re The Pac. Lumber Co.),
584 F.3d 229, 246–47 (5th Cir. 2009).
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law that the indubitable equivalent standard could not be met.244 Had the
Court continued to a factual analysis, it would have concluded that a plan
providing for the sale of a debtor’s assets without credit bidding does not
fail to satisfy § 1129(b)(2)(A) as a matter of law, but rather can satisfy the
indubitable equivalent standard if the court equitably determines the value
of the secured creditor’s claim.
As discussed earlier, the Bankruptcy Code recognizes two equally
valid means of determining the value of a creditor’s claim: via a judicial
proceeding245 or by selling the collateral at a public auction.246 A judicial
determination of value, codified in § 506(a),247 provides the means for both
the debtor and the creditor to present evidence of the collateral’s appraised
value.248 Courts recognize that this is often an “inexact science”;249
however, it may be the best alternative given the purpose of the valuation
and the goals of the particular bankruptcy reorganization. The Supreme
Court in Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash blessed the use of a judicial
valuation for cramdown plans and determined that the replacement value
standard is the appropriate valuation to use.250
In order for a court to determine if the objecting creditor is receiving
the indubitable equivalent of its claim, the court must first value the
collateral. If the proposed plan limits valuation by auction subject to credit
bidding, the court must value the collateral by the only other option
recognized by the Bankruptcy Code: judicially. Thus, a plan proposing to
sell the debtor’s assets free and clear of liens while restricting credit
bidding without cause can only satisfy the standard of indubitable
equivalence if the court first values the claim judicially. RadLAX fails to
244
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discuss judicial valuation at all. River Road discusses judicial valuation as
an alternative to valuation by auction, but does not discuss why it restricts
judicial valuation when assets are to be sold.251 In re The Pacific Lumber
Co. correctly recognized these options, concluding that the judicial
valuation was not erroneous and that the stringent indubitable equivalent
standard was met.252
CONCLUSION
Congress, in response to the RadLAX decision, should amend the
Bankruptcy Code to permit judicial valuation of claims to combat
aggressive lending strategies and promote the rehabilitation of businesses.
The debate surrounding § 1129(b) has occurred during a time of elevated
Chapter 11 filings with significantly undersecured creditors.253 Granting
debtors the choice to restrict credit bidding will offer them essential
flexibility to restructure their entities. Rather than host an asset sale in
which potential bidders will likely be dissuaded by a nontraditional lender
holding a credit bid far in excess of the current market value of the assets,
debtors will be able to fix the collateral valuation judicially. Any bids
received in excess of the judicial valuation will benefit the subordinated
creditors and equity holders within the estate.254 Additionally, as the In re
Philadelphia Newspapers auction shows us, increased bidder attendance
brought on by a restriction on credit bidding will foster a more competitive
auction environment, likely resulting in a higher asset sale price.
The Supreme Court should have followed the approach taken by In re
The Pacific Lumber Co. and permitted debtors to choose whether to
prohibit credit bidding at an auction sale.255 Due to their similarity in text
and purpose, the Court should have analyzed § 1129(b) in conjunction with
§ 361 in a way that reflects uniform interpretation.256 Because § 361 does
not impose a functional plan classification (i.e., what the plan provides
does not govern under which subprovision it must be confirmed), § 1129(b)
251
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should also not impose such a functional classification. Instead, § 1129(b)
should apply in a consistent manner with § 361, permitting a plan to be
confirmed under the indubitable equivalent prong even if it has
characteristics that are similar to other subprovisions.
Asset sale plans that restrict credit bidding can satisfy the indubitable
equivalent standard if the creditors are paid the judicially determined value
of their collateral. The Bankruptcy Code permits valuation to occur either
judicially or via an auction sale, subject to the ability to credit bid.257 If
credit bidding is restricted at auction, judicial valuation provides an
alternative that will assure that the creditors are receiving the indubitable
equivalent of their claim.258
When addressing this circuit split, the Supreme Court should have
ensured an internally consistent interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code, and
also an interpretation that promotes the purpose of Chapter 11. The
Bankruptcy Code does not protect a creditor’s upside potential; however,
nontraditional lenders are using credit bidding as a tool to accomplish just
that.259 The Supreme Court in RadLAX affirmed a practice that protects the
investments of creditors at the expense of a reorganizing entity. In response
to this, Congress should amend the Bankruptcy Code so that the cramdown
provisions once again promote effective rehabilitation and reorganization
of debtors.
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